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Abstract 
The dissatisfaction of developing countries with the new Trade Round surfaced first in 
the WTO meeting in Seattle in autumn 1999. The Round was finally launched in Doha in 
2001. Nevertheless, since the, the negotiations has faced with difficulties and deadlocks. 
The author argues that such difficulties are rooted in the economic philosophy behind the design 
of GATT/WTO rules and in their implementation by developed countries. The interrelated 
issues of conflict of ideology/interests and imbalances in the power relationship between 
developing and developed countries are the main cause of the inherent bias in the world trading 
system against developing countries. Such bias prevailed right from the time of the inception of 
the Breton Woods System as an alternative to the Keynes’s proposal and the Havana charter. The 
combination of these factors has been reflected in a number of contradictions, double standards 
and asymmetries not only in GATT/WTO rules in favour of developed countries and their large 
corporations. It has also influenced the negotiation of developed countries with developing 
countries during the so-called “Doha Development Round”  
 
 The author refers to the particular example of negotiation on NAMA, in some details, to 
highlight inconsistencies between the objectives/spirit of the agreed text of the Doha Round and 
subsequent proposals made by developed countries. If these proposals were to be agreed upon 
they would limit policy space of developing countries necessary for their industrialization. It may, 
in fact, lock many of them in production and exports of primary commodities and at best, 
resource-based and assembly operations.  
 
 He further argues that unless these asymmetries are addressed, there will be a great risk 
of the collapse of the international trading system with its adverse socio-political consequences 
for the international community. Drawing on the experience of successful early and late 
industrializers and the failure of recent across-the-board and universal trade liberalization, he 
proposes the necessary changes in WTO rules commensurate with industrialization and 
development. 
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I. Introduction 
The dissatisfaction of developing countries with the new Trade Round has seriously surfaced 
since the WTO meeting in Seattle in autumn 1999 and has led to a series of interruption 
in the negotiation process of the Doha Round in recent years. With the collapse of the talks 
between developed and developing countries in again July 2008, it is, in fact, faced with a 
deadlock. The purpose of this article is to explain that such a deadlock is rooted in the interrelated 
conflicts of interests/ideology and the imbalance in the power relationship between developing 
and developed countries. Such conflicts of ideology and imbalance existed right from the time of 
the inception of GATT, when the “development oriented” proposal by Keynes was turned down 
in favour of an alternative proposal by White, and has continued since then.  
 In terms of ideology, the origin of the problem goes back to Adam Smith whose universal 
theory of free trade was based purely on his “cosmopolitan approach”. He did not distinguish 
differences between interests of individuals, nations and mankind as a whole and believed what 
was in the interest of Britain was also in the interest of the world as a whole. More recently, 
Samuelson (2004) has argued that if developing countries specialize in production and exports in 
accordance with static comparative advantage, the net real income of both developed and 
developing countries will improve. By contrast, if developing countries penetrate into exports of 
products in which developed countries had comparative advantage previously (he calls it dynamic 
fair free trade) developed countries would suffer loss in per capita income. In other words, 
“dynamic faire free trade” is not in the interest of developed countries. 
 The combination of the imbalance in the power relationship and the ideology/interests of 
the dominant powers have been manifested in a number of contradictions, double standards and 
asymmetries in the rules and regulations of the international trading system, practices of  
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developed countries and the process of trade negotiations in favour of developed countries and 
their corporations to the detrimental interests of developing countries They include, e.g.: 
• Inherent contradictions in the design of GATT/WTO rules; 
• Double standards reflected in contradictions between agreed rules and their 
implementations by developed countries; 
• Inconsistencies between the objectives/spirit of the agreed text of the “Doha 
Development Round” and the position of developed countries during the process of 
subsequent negotiations exemplified by the case of NAMA in this paper.  
If the proposals made by developed countries on NAMA are approved, it will limit, we will show, 
the policy space of developing countries in general, will halt upgrading of the industrial structure 
of those with some industrial capacity, and lock lower-income countries, with little industrial 
capacity, in production and exports of primary commodities, resources based industries and at 
best labour intensive products through assembly operations. 
   We will further argue that unless these asymmetries are addressed, there will be a great 
risk of collapse of the international trading system with its adverse socio-political consequences 
for the international community. On the basis of experience of successful industrializers and the 
failure of recent across-the-board trade liberalization, as prescribed by neo-liberals through 
“Washington Consensus” and international financial institutions, the author proposes the 
necessary changes in WTO rules in order to make them conducive to industrialization and 
development. 
 To proceed, we will first refer to the ideology and economic philosophy behind 
GATT/WTO rules. Subsequently, the general inconsistencies in design of the world trading 
system will be highlighted in section III. In the same section, some of the contradiction between 
the agreed rules and their implementation by developed countries will be explained. Sections IV 
and V is devoted to the process of NAMA negotiations and the implication of proposals made by 
 5 
developed countries for the industrialization of developing countries by drawing on the 
experience of early and late industrializers. The final section will conclude the paper.  
 
II. Ideology and economic philosophy behind GATT/WTO rules 
 
The philosophy behind GATT/WTO rules is the static version of the theory of cost comparative 
advantage which advocates universal free trade. This theory is strongly biased and influenced by 
ideology of its founder Adam Smith and his neo-liberal followers who advocate across-the-board 
trade liberalization. A number of famous neo-classical economists do admit that free trade is an 
“ideal” because the theory of CA is based on some unrealistic assumptions (e.g. Haberler, 1950: 
227; Viner, 1953: 4-5; Corden, 1974: 7-8 and most important of all Samuelson, 1938: 266 and 
1939:195). Yet in the end universal free trade remains the “religion” of neo-liberals, including the 
above-mentioned authors, “regardless of its lack of theoretical and empirical validity” (Subasat, 
2003:163).  
 Adam Smith’s theory of universal free international trade had three main characteristics: 
it was focused on the allocative functions of the markets, thus allocative efficiency, to the 
exclusion of their creative functions as instruments of economic change (Kaldor,1972: 1240); it 
was concerned with the expansion of international trade as against the development of 
“productive power”( economic development) (List, 1856:253 and Shafaeddin 2005.b); it was also 
concerned with maximizing the welfare of the world economy as a whole ignoring the fact that 
some nations may give more weight to their own welfare than the collective  welfare of the 
mankind as a whole. The ideology behind his theory was that what was in the interest of Britain 
was also in the interest of the world at large (List, ibid: 245-6 and 261).  
 The ideology and bias in Adam Smith’s theory is also strongly reflected on the new 
version of the theory of international trade based mainly on views expressed by Heckscher, Ohlin 
and Samuelson (H-O-S version) and more recently advocated through so-called “Washington 
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Consensus”.  Allocative efficiency remains the main concern of neo-liberals but the development 
of dynamic comparative advantage remains out of their considerations. For example, Williamson 
(1999:19) clearly admits that “none of ideas spawned by …development literature…plays an 
essential role in motivating the Washington consensus…” More importantly, the ideology and 
value judgment behind the neo-liberal theory is in no where clearer than in the contradictory 
remarks by Paul Samuelson the guru of free trade in his paper published more recently 
(Samuelson 2004) and his earlier papers published  late 1930s-referred to in the previous 
paragraph. Earlier on he clearly stated that “some trade is better than no trade, but that 
does not necessarily imply that free trade is the optimum for any country” (Samuelson, 
1938:266).  This would imply that a developing country may not necessarily specialize 
according its static comparative advantage; it may develop some other industries to enter 
into production and exports of new (non-traditional) products). In his 2004, however, he 
argues that if a large developing country, e.g. China [or a group of developing countries], 
specialize in accordance with static comparative advantage, and the developing country 
(ies) manage(s) to improve productivity in these products, the net real national income of 
the developing country (ies) as well as the importing developed country (ies), which 
specialize in industrial products, will improve. Such a situation is regarded by him as an 
argument in favour of globalization (Ibid: 136). Nevertheless, if the developing country 
(ies) penetrate(s) into production and exports of goods in which a developed county (ies) 
previously had comparative advantage, by improving productivity in these goods [a 
possibility of developing and specializing in accordance with its dynamic comparative 
advantage]  , the outcome will be different. In such a situation, the developed county (ies) 
will suffer permanent loss of per capita real income (Ibid. 137). Hence, he implicitly 
advocates that it is in the interest of developed countries that the developing country (ies) 
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specialize(s) in accordance with its (their) static comparative advantage. In other words, 
the static comparative advantage indicates that a developing county can specialize in 
exporting what it already produces-not what it would like to produce and export.  
 The neo-liberals also extend the implication of the theory of static comparative to 
what the developing country “ought to” specialize in. The Samuelson’s proposition is in 
contrast to views of the Gomery and Baumol (2000), Cline (1983), Amsden (1989).and 
Shafaeddin (2005.b).according to which free trade and specialization in accordance with 
static comparative advantage is not necessarily always to the advantage of a developing 
county. In the Samuelson’s proposition China’s improvement in productivity results from 
technical innovation which “takes place by imitation or home ingenuity” (Ibid: 137), but 
free trade still prevails. In the Gomery-Baumol postulation, dynamic comparative 
advantage is achieved through temporary protection and Government intervention. This 
formulation is closer to earlier argument by Samuelson that “some trade is better than no 
trade”, but “this does not mean that free trade is always the best”.  
 The implication of Samuelson’s new argument is that faced with the possibility of 
penetration of developing countries into production and exports of products in which they 
have comparative advantage, developed countries (ies) have two different options: 
protect their market against imports of capital/technology intensive industrial goods from 
developing countries, or push developing countries to remain specialized in accordance 
with their “static comparative advantage”. In practice, as far as manufactured goods are 
concerned developed countries are basically opting for the second option. They push 
developing countries to liberalize their trade regimes across-the-board and prematurely; 
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they deny them access to new technology needed for upgrading of their industrial 
structure by protecting through Intellectual Property Right (TRIPS).  
 Further, for main products in which developing countries have static comparative 
advantage, i.e. labour intensive products, and particularly agricultural products, they have 
been protecting their own markets while universal free trade is advocated to, or imposed 
on, developing countries. The free trade ideology is applied to the extent that it is in the 
interest of developed countries. They do not practice what they preach. The 
contradictions in rules governing GATT/WTO agreements, inconsistencies between 
agreed rules and their implementation by developed countries, and in their proposals 
during the process of negotiations on NAMA are manifestation of such double standards.  
 
 
III. General contradictions  
in GATT/WTO rules and their implementation 
 
Referring to the failure of international trade negotiation in Seattle in 1999, a 
distinguished Yale University Scholar pointed-out that: “what Seattle showed was that 
there is a lot more angst beneath the surface”1. This angst is basically related to 
differences between the interests of developed and developing countries in international 
trade. Right from the time of its inception of GATT; the Agreement concluded was 
biased in fovour of the former group. Further, the subsequent agreements, reached in the 
following trade rounds, have also suffered from inherent contradictions in terms and 
asymmetries influenced by double standards by industrialized countries. There are 
                                                 
1
 Jeffrey Garten, International Herald Tribune, 9 December 1999. 
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contradictions in the design of GATT/WTO rules and inconsistencies between the agreed rules 
and their implementations by developed countries. 
 
i. The GATT Treaty of 1947 
To begin with, after the Second World War, two main proposals were on the table for 
drawing international rules on trade and payment systems and establishing the necessary 
international agencies. The Keynes proposal was “development oriented” as against 
“White proposal” which was more restricted in its scope. The latter was ultimately used 
as a basis for the Breton Woods system covering the World Bank, IMF and GATT. The 
Keynes proposal comprised of ITO (International Trade Organization), as an 
“indispensable” third pillar of the Bretton Woods system, and the creation of a world 
currency based on primary commodities. The Charter of ITO, known as Havana Charter, 
was negotiated and agreed in Havana under the auspices of the UN. ITO was supposed to 
be established as a specialized UN agency. The objective of the Havana Charter was not 
only to reduce tariff barriers but also, and more importantly, to attain“…the higher 
standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development, envisaged in Article 55 of that [UN] Charter.” (Para 3 of chapter 1 of the 
Havana Charter)2. The Charter specifically refereed, inter alia, to the expansion of 
production, and industrial development “particularly of those countries which are still in 
early stages of industrial development”, “access to the markets, products and productive 
facilities”[e.g. access to technology] and removal of restrictive business practices ( 
Chapter 1) as objectives of the ITO. The text of the Charter included detailed discussion 
                                                 
2
 The Havana Charter was negotiated through the UN Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana 
between 21 November 1947 and 24 March 1948. The Final Act of which  was approved at the later date  by 
the representative of  16 developed countries, including the USA, and 33 developing countries and 
territories who were present.  
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of modalities for employment creation, cooperation for reconstruction and development, 
labour standards, commercial policy, reducing restrictive business practices, commodity 
agreements for stabilization of commodity prices, the operation of ITO and eventually the 
creation of a “Special Fund" in the UN, etc. The Charter was not, however, ratified by the 
US congress (Singer 1989:6-9 and UNCTAD, 1985).  
 In the meantime, in parallel to the negotiation on Havana Charter, the 
representative of 15 governments negotiated reduction of trade barriers which led to the 
GATT treaty signed initially by 23 countries in 1947. The treaty was drawn mainly on the 
basis of the interest of the developed countries of the time (10 countries), although 12 
developing countries and territories (mostly colonies) and Czechoslovak Republic were 
among signatories. The establishment of GATT, which came into effect outside the UN 
system, instead of ITO, meant that the Breton Wood system "remained incomplete… and 
distorted" (Singer, Ibid). It was "… a weak version, almost a caricature of the intended 
ITO"; it remained a “First World” institution as it did not make "allowance for special 
problems of developing countries"(Ibid: 6-7). The Bretton Woods system which was 
supposed to include UN, ITO, IMF and the World Bank was based only on the last two, 
and The GATT treaty was drawn only on the basis of the chapter of the Havana Charter 
which dealt with Commercial Policies aiming at reduction of trade barriers. Even then it 
was full of contradictions.  
 
ii. Contradictions and double standards 
Right from the beginning, the international trading system, based on the GATT Treaty, 
suffered from a number of inherent contradictions and asymmetries. Such systemic 
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contradictions have also continued to manifest themselves in various forms in the 
subsequent negotiations and the results of various Trade Rounds as of today. 
To begin with, the Preamble to GATT (1949) clearly refer to trade liberalization 
as the objective of the Treaty: “….[by] entering into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade and to elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
commerce….have ….agreed….”. Hence, if international trade were to be liberalized free 
of discriminatory treatment, one would expect the existence of consistencies in 
GATT/WTO rules. Yet the GATT/WTO system contains a number of exceptional clauses 
which reminds oneself of exceptional clauses in the "Animal Farm" story. For example, 
first of all, according to GATT/WTO rules, the power and influence of the governments 
in the flow of international trade has to decline through reduction, or elimination, of 
tariffs and non-tariffs measures. Yet, the power and influence of TNCs in international 
trade is allowed to increase continuously. According to table 1, 500 companies accounted 
for about 70 per cent of world trade around year 2000. The cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, which have accelerated since 1996, i.e. after the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round, have also continued their high speed in recent years as shown in table 2. In fact, 
while the degree of concentration in international markets has increased significantly, the 
governments’ controls on TNCs have been relaxed through TRIMs and GATS. 
According to Robert Wade: 
These [international] regulations are not about limiting companies’ options, as 
“regulations” normally connotes. Rather they are about limiting the options of 
developing country governments to constrain the options of companies operating or  
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Table 1: The share of top firms in global production and trade (late 1990s) 
 Activity Number  Per cent 
 
 All output 200  28 
 Industrial output 1000 80 
 World trade 500 70 
Source: Mooney (2000), 1-2:74. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Annual average cross-border mergers and acquisition with value of  
more than $1 billion, 1987-2005 
 
Periods   No. of deals   value ($billion) 
1987-1996    23    49   
1997-2001    110    445   
2002-2004    71    186 
2005     141    454 
2006     172    584 
2007    
Source: Based on UNCTAD ( 2007): table1.1. 
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hoping to operate within their borders. In effect, the new regulations are designed to 
expand the options of developed country firms to enter and exit markets more easily, 
with fewer restrictions and obligations and to lock in appropriation of technological 
rents” ( Wade2005:80), 
The large firms coordinate their activities not only outside the market, but they 
also shape the market and create barriers to entry for new comers. They coordinate their 
activities through strategic planning, strategic actions and vertical and horizontal 
relationship with other firms. Further, they have the capacity to influence production 
costs, prices, technology and the quality of goods they produce.  They can target their 
market; influence the market structure and the environment within which they operate 
thus limiting the entry of new firms to the market. 
The firm level economies of scale of large established firms are, in particular, 
important, not only because they are sources of cost advantage (which are different from 
factor cost advantages), but more importantly, because they are sources of “strategic 
behaviour”, “dynamic competition” and progressive and cumulative changes over time. 
Such a Schumpeterian source of dynamic competitive process and power of “creative 
destruction” implies that the ability to export would depend on “comparative strategic 
advantage” rather than comparative cost advantage alone which is behind the philosophy 
of GATT/WTO rules3 
Secondly, since the inception of GATT trade in manufactured goods has been 
subject to liberalization in various rounds of trade negotiations, but agricultural products 
have been largely excluded. According to OECD sources, the amount of producers 
                                                 
3
  For more details and references see Shafaeddin (2005.a): 9-14 
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support paid in OECD countries in 2004 is estimated to be nearly 280 billion dollars 
(WTO, 2006:151) .When export subsidies added to this figure, the total amount of 
subsidies reaches about 1 billion dollars a day. The “cotton scandal”, which cost 
livelihood of a large number of populations in rural Africa, is only one example of the 
problem (see below). 
 At the time the liberalization of the agricultural sector was under negotiation 
in WTO, the US delegation advocated, in the Food Summit in Rome in spring of 
2008, further liberalization of the agricultural sector and preached “all countries to 
allow free flow of food…” Yet around the same time, the US congress passed the 
2008 Farm Bill, which became law, increasing “trade distorting support” on 17 out 
of 25 agricultural products. Although the approved bill contains subsidies which are 
partly regarded non-distorting (Green Box subsidies), they have, in fact, trade 
distorting effects (SUNS, 19 May, 2008). The bill also provides subsidies to a couple 
with farm income of up to $1.5 million (Ibid and SUNS, 5 June, 2008).  
 Susan Schwab, the US trade representative, said in early July 2008‘it was 
unconscionable that developing countries were insisting on shielding their farms. “ 
In the face of the food price crisis, it’s ironic that the debate came down to how 
much and how fast could nations raise their barriers to imports of food” (dg 
Communities available at htpp//fdi.developmentgateway.org). But she does not 
consider unconscionable that more or less around the same time the US government 
passes a law approving agricultural subsidies of $56.8 billion per annum, which 
amount to over 69 per cent of value of its agricultural exports in 2005, and it is 
higher than the allocation of $49.5 billion in the 2002 farm bill. 
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 Developed countries, justify support of their agricultural sector for social 
(income support for farmers) and strategic (food security) reasons. It is not clear 
why social considerations are relevant to farmers with income per head of $1.5 
million, but not to farmers of low-income countries with income of $1 a day (per 
capita income of 366).  
Thirdly, even in the case of manufactured goods, products of interest to 
developing countries have been restricted either under exceptional arrangements until 
recently (e.g. textiles and clothing through certain arrangements in early 1960 and then 
through Multi-Fiber Arrangements, which came into effect in 1974) or through tariff 
escalations, safeguard measures and arbitrary anti-dumping practices (see zeroing below). 
While the average tariff on industrial goods in developed countries is low, tariffs on 
products of export interest to developing countries have been relatively high. This is 
because in the previous trade rounds, developed countries “have significantly reduced 
tariffs on the products of mutual interests among themselves”, but continued to maintain 
higher tariffs on products of export interest to developing countries (Das 2005:34 -36). 
Fourthly, According to the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreements, developing 
countries were forbidden to protect, or subsidize, their infant industrial exports 
selectively. Further, the TRIMs forbid theme to impose local content requirement, and 
obliges them to treat local and foreign companies equally-even though they lack equal 
capabilities. By contrast, developed countries benefit from infant industry protection of 
their new technology for over 20 years through TRIPS.  
The double standard on protection is evident in the speech by the US 
representative to the ECOSOC in 2007. He clearly defended the need for protection of 
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technology: “…technological change is driven by protection [our italic] of IPRs 
[Intelectual Property Rights]. If we do not provide the incentives of IPRs, our 
technological progress will slow or dry up” (SUNS, 4 July 2007). It is not clear how 
change in the structure of exports of developing countries from primary commodities to 
manufactured goods does not need incentive through protection, but technological change 
does.  
 The Agreements on, the TRIPs, TRIMs, GATS and ASCM (the Agreement on 
Subsidy and Countervailing Measures) severely limit the policy space of developing 
countries (Shafaeddin (2005.b). Summarizing, the impact of the first three agreements, 
Wade concludes that: “With a touch of hyperbole the agreements [TRIPs,TRIMS and 
GATS] could be called a slow-motion Great Train Robbery” Wade (2005) (Ibid: 89). 
Even Mr. Lamy, the Director General of GATT and former trade representative of 
EU, admitted, in his speech to ECOSOC on July the second, 2007,  that: “….today a 
number of the current substantive rules of the WTO do perpetuate[our italics ] some bias 
against developing countries.  
iii. Implementation issues 
Developed countries did not fully implement even those rules to which they had 
agreed with through GATT/WTO. Examples of their double standards in what they have 
preached, and agreed with, and what they have been practicing are numerous before and 
after the Uruguay Round. The GATT agreement had been already eroded before the UR 
by the lack of respect for “unconditional MFN principle” and the non-reciprocity clause, 
in negotiation and dealings with developing countries, “managed trade” and unilateral 
action for “graduation” of developing countries which had benefited from GSP, resort to 
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restrictive business practices, etc. Managed trade took place in the past e.g. through 
application of selective and discriminatory non-tariff measures, safeguards such as 
countertrade, subsidies unjustified anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties, etc. 
These selective protective measures inhibited market access, in particular of new and 
fast-growing suppliers with competitive products. Not only textiles and clothing but also 
some other products, such as iron and steel and automobiles, were subject to managed 
trade    (UNCTAD, 1985:68-78). Only “…about 20 per cent of world trade was governed 
by the fundamental GATT instrument of unconditional MFN tariffs” (Ibid:75)4.   
Examples of the lack of implementation of the UR agreement by developed countries are 
not few. Partial implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) is a 
clear and important example. These products accounted for about 60 per cent of exports 
of manufactured goods of developing countries in late 1990s (WTO, 1998, tables 44 and 
45). In contrast to the agreed schedule in the UR, developed countries left the bulk (49 
per cent) of the quotas to be removed at the end of phase-out period (2005) most of which 
included high value added products5. 
Another example is the use, by developed countries, of targeted exports subsidies 
and industrial policy which is restricted by Uruguay Round Agreements (URAs). 
                                                 
4
 The breakdown of the fixed exchange rate also contributed to the erosion of the GATT system as 
fluctuations in the exchange rate would result in the price of trade goods which often far exceeds the tariff 
rates, particularly in developed countries; for example  a 20 percent depreciation of the dollar exchange rate 
would lead, cet par,  to 20 per cent increase in price of imported goods to the USA which far exceeds the 
US average tariff rate of e.g. 6 per cent. The volatility in the exchange rate has in fact contributed to the 
tendency towards the use of flexible measures and managed trade(see UNCTAD, Ibid: 76-78), and chapter 
VI. 
 
5
 For details and other instances of the lack of implementation of ATC by developed countries, see M. 
Shafaeddin (2005.c), chapter 8. 
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Industrial policy and export promotion still prevails in various forms, including the use of 
tax holiday and subsidy, in most developed countries, including the United States, which 
is the most advanced industrial economy:  
It can be argued that while the Washington Institutions stepped up their 
ideological crusade against government intervention in the Second and Third 
Worlds, domestically the US actually increased government assistance to 
business. The Small Business Administration financed 26,000 companies in 1992; 
in 1997, the number of companies receiving subsidised finance from this federal 
office alone had grown to 58000. While the Washington Institutions have 
managed the de-industrialisation of the Second and Third Worlds during the 
1990’s – under the theory that “all economic activities are alike” – within the US 
there is a plethora of government support programs specifically targeting 
manufacturing. Manufacturing industries with investments below 40 million 
dollars are eligible to receive loans at about 50 per cent of prime rate, subsidised 
by the federal government. At the last count, in July 1999, there were 821 
different income tax credit schemes promoting investments in the real economy 
operating in the 50 states of the US6.  
 
 
 The dispute between the USA and EU on Government subsidization of exports of 
industrial goods by US companies, for which the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of WTO 
gave verdict against the USA Government, is yet another well known example (Reinert, 
2000).It is estimated that in the fiscal year 1999, the USA provided $3.5 billion worth of 
tax reduction to between 30000 to 7000 USA companies on about $250 billion worth of 
exports. The companies benefited included such large ones as, GE, Boeing, IBM, 
Microsoft, etc. (Financial Times, 25 January 2007:7). Despite the verdict against the 
USA, wide spread subsidization of USA companies have continued. For example, $5b.in 
the form of aid and $10b guaranteed loans were provided to airline companies after 9/11, 
                                                 
6
 Reinert, (2000):18–19) 
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or tax breaks worth of  $3.4 billion, and $2.5 billion over 5 years, were provided to the oil 
companies and mining companies, respectively7.  
 Developed countries fulfillment of obligation under the URAs to improve market 
access was also inappropriate. For example in converting non-tariff barriers to tariffs, 
many developed countries took on tariffs levels higher than their non-tariff equivalent; in 
the case of tariff reduction they chose commodities with low tariffs for large percentage 
tariff reduction and those with high tariffs for small percentage reduction; the use of 
variable tariffs and non-ad-valuren tariffs became less transparent; the tariff rate quotas 
were implemented in a way that they made little contribution to market access for 
products of developing countries (Shafaeddin,2005.c:189-90). 
 In the case of agricultural products, according to the UR Agreement, the overall 
trade-distorting support of the US, which was supposed not to increase beyond 1992 
level, was in fact increased from $16.3 b in 2002, to nearly $19 in 2005 (SUNS, 5 
October 2007). 
 
The lack of compliance 
The lack of respect and/or compliance with the verdicts of Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) of the WTO is another example of the implementation of WTO rules by some 
developed countries, particularly the USA. The failure to respect the approved rules and 
verdict of the DSB not only undermines the integrity of the system, but also discredit it 
reducing the security and predictably of the world trading system. We will refer here only 
to two examples, the so called "cotton scandal" and Zeroing in antidumping operations.  
                                                 
7
 For details see Testimony of Ralph Nader Before the Committee on  Budget ,US House of 
Representatives, June 1999 and Boillier S. and Weissman (2007).  
 
 20 
 
Cotton Scandal 
According to the Peace Clause of the UR Agreement (Part II, article 13.B (ii), the cotton 
subsidies should not exceed that of 1992 marketing year. But in practice the USA has 
continued ignoring the peace clause. In 2001/2 alone the amount of subsidies paid by the 
Government was $3.9, double that of 1992 (Shafaeddin, 2005.c:190), or 130 per cent of 
the value of cotton production of the country! A quarter of the subsidy was received by 
one per cent of the richest US farmers (Ibid: 191). The corresponding amount of subsidy 
was over 3 times higher than total exports of cotton from least developed countries8  such 
subsidies were at significant loss of low cost, but poor countries. For example the 
resulting loss for 10 million African producers amounted to $301m in 2001/2. The loss 
for Mali, e.g., was equivalent of 1.7 per cent of the GDP and 9 per cent of exports of the 
country during the same period (op.cit). 
 The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism has ruled against the USA, in its verdict 
on the USA’s cotton subsidies but there has so far been little change in the USA’s 
practices. On 20th June 2008, the DSB upheld the ruling of the Applet Body issued in 
2004 in relation to a dispute brought by Brazil, initiated in 2003, on the use of 
subsidies on cotton and against which the USA had appealed. The DSB requested 
the US Government to bring its practices into conformity with its obligations under 
the Agreements on Agriculture and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Again 
the US representative was in disagreement with the verdicts of the DSB. More 
importantly, more or less at the same time, in defiance to the ruling by DSB, the US 
                                                 
8
 In 2007 the total cotton exports of developing counties amounted to about $4.5 billion (UNCTAD, 
Statistical Handbook, 2008).  
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Congress passed "the 2008 farm bill", with little changes in subsidies in its “cotton 
incentive programme” contained in its 2002 farm bill. (SUNS, 23 June 2008). 
 While we have referred to the case of USA, heavy subsidization of cotton exports is 
widespread by various developed countries.9. 
 
Zeroing practices in anti-dumping 
Developing countries are supposed to compete in international market. But when they 
develop their industrial base competitively, they are faced with arbitrary implementation 
of article VI of the 1947 GATT on duping. According to article VI, the existence of 
dumping per se does not permit an importing country to impose countervailing duties. It 
should be determined that it causes, or threatens material injury to domestic industries   
.Yet sometimes governments of developed countries impose countervailing measure 
arbitrarily10.Furthermore, the methodology applied for the calculation of the dumping 
margin continues to be flawed by “zeroing” in the case of the USA despite various 
verdicts of the DSB. 
 To explain, the dumping margin is the difference between the export price (fob) 
and normal value11 of a product. If the export price of a product to a destination is less 
than its normal value, dumping exists. Zeroing overestimates the dumping margins or 
even fabricates them. The department of Commerce of the USA calculates weighted-
                                                 
9
 See Ibid: 190-94 for details. 
 
10
 Under certain conditions, it can be imposed ex-anti before the determination of the injury or threat of 
injury (article VI.c of GATT 1947) 
 
11
 The normal value is “the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when 
destined for consumption in the exporting country”, or the highest comparable price for the like product for 
export to a third country, or the cost of production in the exporting country plus  a reasonable selling cost 
and profit (para 1 of Article VI of GATT 1947). 
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average of net prices (after allowing for transport and other business margins) of various 
transaction on .each imported product with the normal value of a product. In calculating 
the weighted average however, the negative dumping margins are set equal to zero i.e. in 
cases the selling price of an imported product is higher than its normal value; it is not 
taken into account. Thus the negative dumping margins are excluded from the calculation 
of the dumping margin. 
 It is estimated that in 17 determinations, out of a sample of 18, “….the dumping 
margin was inflated by zeroing. In 5 cases, the overall dumping margin would have been 
negative. On average, the dumping margins in the 17 cases would have been 86.4 per 
cent lower, if zeroing had not been employed” (Ikenson, 2004:2). Hence, Zerioing is a 
sort of selective protection tool which shields domestic producers from competitive 
imports. 
 EU accepted to refrain from zeroing as of 1998 after the first case was brought 
against it to the DSB. By contrast, in the case of USA, although so far 12 disputes have 
been brought against it, the Government has refused to implement any of the rulings. It 
has continued zeroing regarded illegal by DSB. The US Government often has 
challenged the verdicts with the pretext of existence of flaws in the argument of the 
Appellate Body. The latest example is the verdict of the DSB on 20 May 2008 on ruling 
of the Appellate body of 30the April 2008 regarding a case brought to the DSB by 
Mexico on exports of stainless steel. More importantly, not only it has opposed banning 
zeroing, but “…influential congressmen and senators have made it clear that there would 
not be Doha deal, if it did not have changes in the WTO rules to allow for 
‘zeroing”(SUNS,15 May 2008). 
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 Generally speaking, there is a lot of difference between what developing countries 
preach developing countries to do and what they actually do themselves. According to an 
ex-USA official: “…[president ] Regan himself, despite his devotion to open market in 
general and free trade in particular, granted more income  relief to US industry than any 
of his predecessors in more than a century” ( Bergsten, 2001:8)12. 
 In nutshell, while developed countries preach developing countries to liberalize, 
they have tried to avoid it themselves in many cases. The Nobel Prize winner, Professor 
Stiglitz, once said: “I found myself in uncomfortable position of an American saying “do 
as we say, not as we do”. The case of NAMA is also a clear reflection of such a double 
standard in the position of developed countries during the course of the negotiation in the 
Doha Round.  
IV. NAMA negotiations 
The development orientation of the Doha Round is undeniable if one bases his judgment 
on the stated objectives of the Round as contained in the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
and its related Work Programme. Yet there are clear inconsistencies between the agreed 
Doha Text and the subsequent proposals made by developed countries during the process 
of negotiations on NAMA the contents of which are to the detriment of industrialization 
of developing countries. Such inconsistencies give the impression that in fact there has 
never been genuine intention for having a development oriented Round. According to an 
editorial in International Herald Tribune, the Doha Round was ‘sold as the “development 
round'. But in practice, it was turned into “market access” round by developed 
                                                 
12
 based on remarks by Treasury Secretary James A. Baker before a conference sponsored by the Institute 
fro International Economics (14 September 1987). 
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countries13'. This statement is confirmed by Charlene Barshefsky, previous US trade 
representative who was involved in the Doha meeting. According to her the wealthy 
nations have not “genuinely pursued a development round14”. They have been pushing 
developing countries to cut tariffs on their industrial and agricultural goods, and services 
substantially and reduce restrictions on activities of multinationals in exchange mainly 
for a slight cut in their tariffs on industrial goods and in their domestic supports for 
agriculture. The comparison of the stated objectives of the Round with the position of 
developing countries during the subsequent negotiation until the collapse of the talk in 
July 2008 is a proof of Barshefsky ‘s statement and an indication of the loss of policy 
space of developing countries if the proposals of developed countries are agreed upon. 
 
Stated objectives of the Doha Round 
 The emphasize put on the development orientation of the Doha Round in general 
is evident in a number of passages of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. For example, 
according to paragraph 2 of the Declaration, “We seek to place their needs [developing 
countries needs] and interests at the heart [our italics] of the Work Programme adopted in 
this declaration”. Similarly, article 6 of the same declaration emphasizes that: “We 
strongly reaffirm our commitment to objective of sustainable development, as stated in 
the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement”. These passages reinforce earlier 
GATT/WTO rules and decisions in which the special need of individual developing 
countries and industries are recognized (e.g. Article XXVIIIbis of GATT 1994, and para8 
                                                 
13
 “Trade talks that were meant to help the poorest”, International Herald Tribune, 22.10.2007: p.6. 
  
 
14
 See “Charlene Barshefsky on Doha”, International Herald Tribune, Managing Globalization “Business 
Blog”, 31, January 2007. 
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of Article XXXVI, part IV, GATT 1994). On the particular issue of NAMA paragraphs 
16 and 50 of the Doha Declaration clearly refers to a number of principals to be followed 
during the curse of negotiation in order to attain a favourable outcome for developing 
countries. Accordingly, the negotiations shall take full account of “the special needs and 
interests of developing and least developed country participants…” including: 
 Less than full reciprocity in tariff reduction commitments in favour of 
developing countries; 
 Special and differential treatment for developing and least developed 
countries as stated in part IV of the GATT 1994, etc.; 
 Reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, as 
well as non-tariff barriers, in particular on products of export interest to 
developing countries. 
Para 3.b of Article XXVIIIbis (GATT 94) also clearly refers to “the needs of developing 
countries for more flexible [our italics] use of tariffs protection...” Further, the July 2004 
package again emphasizes the principles of “less than full reciprocity” and “flexibility” in 
favour of developing countries (e.g. paragraphs, 3,4 and 8 of Annex B to the text of  the 
July 2004 Package)15. Flexibility would allow a percentage of tariff lines deviate from the 
full extent of the formula cuts or be exempted from them. In addition, Para 94 of the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration refers to proportionality, or balance between 
ambition levels between NAMA and Agricultural market access. The latter also implies 
that the principals applied to NAMA should be consistence with those applied to 
Agriculture.  
                                                 
15
  See Khor, M. and Yen, G.C. (2005) for details. 
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The position of developed countries during the course of negotiation 
In practice, however, the proposals made by developed countries during the negotiation 
on NAMA are neither conducive to industrialization and development nor consistent with 
those principles.  
 In fact, right after the conclusion of the Doha Declaration, developed countries 
deviated from the objectives of the Doha Round by making proposals which were not in 
the interests of developing countries as contained in the Annex B of the July 2004 
decision. This Annex contained elements of less than full reciprocity and Special and 
differential treatments in favour of developed countries. It was pushed through by the 
chairman of the negotiating group to be sent to the General Council despite the 
opposition by developing countries. The contents of Annex B was, in effect, legally 
nullified by the paragraph 1 of the Annex which regarded them as issues for further 
negotiations rather than agreed decisions (Das, Ibid:29-30). Nevertheless,  developed 
countries have continued, more or less, on the basis of their original proposals contained 
in the remaining articles of Annex B (Articles 2-17), until the collapse of the talks in July 
2008. Between July 2004 and July 2008 a number of new “chairman texts” have been 
issued but the content of none of them has been development16. Developed countries have 
been pushing for across-the-board liberalization of trade in manufactured goods by 
applying the (non-linear) Swiss Formula for cutting and bounding individual tariff lines 
at low level, by limiting flexibility and requesting “anti-concentration” in tariff cuts and 
by asking for compulsory “sectoral initiatives”. They have often ignored the views 
                                                 
16
  Since then the Chairman presented new texts in July 2007, 8  and 28 February 2008, 18 May and July 
2008. Further, Mr Lamy, the Director-General of WTO, presented his own text on 25 July 2008 before the 
talks collapsed once again.  
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expressed by delegations of developing countries, to the extent that certain clauses were 
inserted in the draft negotiating texts presented by the chairman of the NAMA without 
much prior discussion. Further, the use of time pressure, threats, bulling and blame games 
have been among tactics used by developed countries.  
 The choice of the Swiss Formula, vis-à-vis a linear formula, and its coefficients, 
and flexibilities in tariff cuts have been subject of hard negotiation.  
 
The implications of the Swiss Formula 
The Swiss formula proposed in July 2004 text and used for negotiation for tariff cuts, 
despite reluctance of developing countries, is a non-linear formula as follows: 
 T= (a. t)/ (a+t) and  
 R=t/ (a+t)  
where “T” and “t” and “a” are the new and initial tariff rates and constant coefficient, 
respectively, and R is the rate of tariff reduction.  
 This magic and complicated Swiss formula has a few main characteristics which 
are inimical to industrialization of developing countries: 
• . the coefficient (e.g. 15), determines the maximum tariff rate possible under the 
formula irrespective of the country’s present tariff rates and level of 
industrialization, 
• the lower the coefficient, the higher will be the rate of reduction in tariff, 
•  for a given coefficient, the higher the initial tariff rate, the higher the rate of 
reduction in tariff, 
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•  for high tariff rates the rate of reduction in tariffs is higher than when a simple 
linear formula is applied (in which case the same percentage reduction is applied 
to all tariff lines).  
• in a certain range of low tariff rates, the formula will lead to lower rates of 
percentage reduction than those generated by a tariff-independent linear 
reduction17. 
 
 According to the initial proposals made by developing countries, all countries 
were supposed to apply the same (Swiss) formula to cut average tariffs rates drastically 
and reduce their dispersion by binding 95 per cent of their all individual tariff18 lines at 
the same rate at the low levels. For example, the USA proposed that developing countries 
cut tariffs to 8 per cent by 2010 and reducing them to zero by 2015. Certain sectors were 
proposed to be subject to zero tariffs immediately upon the conclusion of the Doha 
Round. The EU proposed non-linear cuts in tariffs according to the Swiss formula and a 
low and uniform coefficient of 10 chosen for both developed and developing countries. 
Their proposal following the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting (2005) was to apply 
coefficients of 15 for developing and 10 for developed countries, receptively19. With 
coefficient of 10 for developed countries, a tariff rate of 5 per cent will be reduced to 3.33 
per cent-a reduction of 33 percent, but only 1.67 percentage point. By contrast, a 
coefficient of 15 per cent for developing countries will reduce a tariff rate of 50 per cent 
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  For details see Shafaeddin (2006.a).  
 
18
  Five per cent of tariff line can be excepted provided the related imports do not exceed 5 per cent of the 
total value of member’s imports (para 8, annex B of the WTO July 2004 Package). 
 
19
  It is also proposed that at least 95 per cent of their individual tariff lines be bound.  
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to 11.5 per cent a reduction of 38.5 percentage point and76 per cent. It is clear that the 
choice of the formula as well as its coefficients would results in less than full reciprocity 
in tariff cuts in favour of developed, not developing countries.  
Since July2004, new coefficients have been proposed, but still remain biased 
against developing countries. In the July 2007, the chairman proposed the coefficient of 
8-9 for developed countries and 19-23 for developing countries. The tariff cuts were to be 
implemented in 5 years and 9 years by developed and developing countries, respectively.  
Trade off between the coefficient and Flexibility in tariff cuts  
Further, allowing higher coefficients (lower tariff cuts) to developing countries required 
the trade-off with flexibilities in tariff reduction and binding. In other words, the number 
of tariff lines sheltered from formula cuts could be a positive function of percentage of 
formula cuts on those line; the higher the cut (the lower the coefficient), the higher the 
flexibility (the higher could be the number of tariffs lines exempted from full formula 
cuts). Accordingly, with coefficients of 19-23, 5% of tariff lines can be left unbound 
provided they do not represent more than 5% of imports of non-agricultural products of 
the country. Alternatively, 10% of tariff lines can be exempted from half formula cut 
provided they do not represent more than 10% of their non-agricultural imports. 
Countries which are prepared not to use any flexibility can apply higher coefficient of 22-
26 i.e. 3 points higher than otherwise required (19-23).  
The July 2007 text also provides some exceptional clauses and extra 
flexibilities for least developed, small and vulnerable economies and recently 
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acceded countries in applying tariff cuts and binding. Nevertheless, they are not 
sufficient to satisfy the needs of these countries for industrialization or upgrading of 
their industrial base20. For example the simplification of the cumbersome rules of 
origins is not considered. 
 
Developed countries criticized the July 2007 text on the ground that developing 
countries are requested to cur tariffs little!! Developing countries requested a minimum of 
25 points difference in the coefficients applied to them and to developed countries as well 
as significant flexibilities in tariff cuts. Their views were ignored in the subsequent 
chairman’s draft texts, including his July 2008 text and finally in Mr Lamy’s draft of 25 
July 2008 before the talks collapsed. 
Mr. Lammy, the head of the WTO secretariat, also acted also as a chairman of 
TNC (Trade Negotiating Committee), in proposing a package consisting of coefficients 
of 8 for developed countries and an option of 20, 22 and 25 for developing countries. 
These coefficients were only the mid points of those proposed by the chair in his July 
2008 text. The flexibilities in tariff cuts would vary depending on the coefficient used: 
 for the coefficient  25,there would be no exemption to cutting tariff lines,  
 for coefficient 20 it would contain two alternatives: exemption of 14 per 
cent, or 6.5% of tariff lines from full formula cuts, provided they would 
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 For details see South Centre (2007), particularly pp 30-34.  
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not represent more than 16 per cent, or 7.5%of imports of manufactured 
goods respectively 
 for coefficient 22, 10% of tariff lines would be exempted from tariff cuts 
provided they would not represent more than 5% of imports of 
manufactured good.  
The difference between coefficients of 25 and 20 is not significant. Taking into account 
the average tariff rate of 30 per cent for developing countries, the new tariff would be 
13.6% and 12%, respectively; they would lead to 54 % (or 16.4 percentage point) and 
60% (or 18 percentage point) cut in tariffs of developing countries, respectively . By 
contrast, the coefficient of 8 would lead to a reduction in simple average tariffs of 
developed countries from about 3.7% to 2.5%) by about 31% (or only 1.2 percentage 
point)21. The comparison of these calculations reveals that the outcome is again 
absolutely the reverse of the less than full reciprocity for developing countries. It 
basically leads to leads to enhanced market access for developed countries.  
 It is interesting to note that in defiance of the agreed rules of GATT, the chair 
claimed that there had never been “agreed definition of reciprocity”. The notion of 
reciprocity and less than full reciprocity in treating developing countries is, in fact, clear 
in the Decision of 28 November 1979 of GATT (see Appendix A). 
 Further, Mr. Lamy’s proposals also limited flexibilities further by linking 
flexibilities (and coefficients) to the so-called “anti-concentration” clause and “sectoral 
                                                 
21
 Taking into account the average tariff rates of 3.9,3.2 and 2.3 for the EU, the USA and Japan, 
respectively, it corresponds to 33% (1.3 percentage points) for EU; 29% (1 percentage point) for the USA 
and 22% (1.6 percentage point) for Japan. 
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initiative” which were initially introduced by the chairman in his July 2008 text. 
According to anti-concentration clause, developing countries must not exclude from any 
formula cuts a whole sector or a proportion of tariff lines in the sector beyond s certain 
level. For example, it is proposed that 20 % of tariff lines with at least 9% of total import 
value in any sector (or HS chapter) must be subject to full formula cuts. The implication 
of this clause is that various parts and components necessary for development of an 
industry can not be protected.  
 The sectoral initiative, was supposed to be non mandatory; it means contracting 
parties should voluntarily reduce tariffs in some sectors to zero or near zero. In practice, 
in the 18 may draft modalities introduced by the chair of NAMA, it was linked to 
flexibilities. In other words, to acquire extra flexibility (or a higher coefficient), a country 
ought to participate in sectoral initiative. 
Hence, the Swiss formula with a low coefficient fits the interests of the developed 
countries, while it goes against the developing countries' interests. The latter would be 
subject to significantly greater reduction in their tariff rates in terms of percentage as well 
as percentage points Even with the latest coefficients and flexibilities proposed By Mr. 
Lamy, the policy space of developing countries will be limited, there will be less than full 
reciprocity and special and different treatment in favour of developed countries. It is true 
that the initial tariffs of developed countries are much lower than those of developing 
countries, but developing countries do need higher tariffs on industrial products as will be 
mentioned shortly.  
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Arbitrary insertion in the draft modalities, by the chairman, threat, bulling 
and blaming have been other tactics used by developed counties. For example, the 
views expressed by the chairman in various draft modalities (e.g. July 2007 text and 
8 February and 28 February 2008 texts) were attributed to the majority of 
members. Yet, developing countries did not confirm this statement and regarded 
some of issues included in his texts arbitrary as they had been hardly discussed in 
the formal meeting. Hence, they were regarded as “coffee shop” proposals.  
 An example of threat and bullying is that made during the course of negotiation in 
July 2008 when anti-concentration and sectoral initiative was introduced and discussed. 
The US and EU representatives threatened that unless these issues were accepted by 
developing countries as drafted by the chairman, they would not agree to opening 
brackets in the text on other issues on which progress had already been made22  Another 
example is their threat that without successful NAMA outcome, there would be no 
reduction in agricultural subsidies, no liberalization in services, no advance in trade 
facilitation, and no development round23. 
Finally, while developed countries did not show much flexibility during the 
negotiation, each time it was interrupted, they blamed a number of developing 
countries engaged in small-group discussions. Further, while developed countries 
insisted on limiting flexibilities in tariff cuts in negotiation on NAMA, they 
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  See “Divisive issues throw shadow over NAMA state of play” in the SUNS (South-North Development 
Monitor), 9 July 2008. 
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 Ibid, 30 May 2008.  
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requested far greater flexibilities in tariff reduction as well as restricting subsidies in 
the course of negotiation for liberalization of agriculture. 
Implications for industrialization 
The application of the proposed coefficients suggested by developed countries 
will have a significant detrimental long-term effect on industrialization of developing 
countries, with no negative effects on developed countries. Developed countries are 
already industrialized; they have the supply capacity to produce capital-intensive, skill-
intensive and technology-intensive goods. By giving up some-in fact in this case small - 
trade barriers on imports in exchange for market access in developing countries, 
developed countries do not sacrifice their long-run industrial development. Of course, 
their upgrading of the industrial sector depends on the development of new technology. 
But they have firmly secured protection of their new technologies through the WTO's 
TRIPS Agreement as mentioned in the previous pages. 
By contrast, the use of tariffs is almost the only remaining trade policy instrument 
for developing countries. Yet the industrial sector of most developing countries is, unlike 
that of developed countries, underdeveloped. Thus, they need to apply higher tariffs to 
some of their industries, particularly new ones. The low and bound tariffs rates being 
proposed will disarm them of an important policy tool for establishing new industries and 
upgrading the existing ones. Clearly, by obtaining further market access in developed 
countries, they will improve the prospects for expanding exports for their existing 
efficient industries, i.e. industries in which they have static comparative advantages. But 
binding tariffs at low levels deprives them of the tool of diversification and expansion of 
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supply capacity in new industries in which they may wish to develop dynamic 
comparative advantage. Therefore, even when market access is provided for such 
potential products, the prospects for their supply expansion will be absent due to the lack 
of policy space. In other words, for the sake of better access to markets for their current 
export products, they sacrifice the ability to establish new industries or diversify their 
production structure away from primary commodities or upgrade their manufacturing 
sector into new products. Such a trade-off will result in deepening of their static 
comparative advantage.  
 Professor Wade correctly argues that “International rules should be judged against 
how they assist or hinder production diversification” (Wade2006: 8), not specialization 
according to static comparative advantage. Otherwise, whatever efficiency is gained due 
to liberalization will be at the cost of growth and diversification in the long-run. He is 
also correct to say that WTO rules makes the “creative function” of the markets more 
difficult by hindering diversification and upgrading of the production structure in 
developing countries; but they encourage industrial upgrading in industrialized countries 
as they “permit industrial policy activism of the kind needed to nurture ‘knowledge-
intensive’ industries and activities” which prevail in developed countries! (Wade 2006: 8-
9).  The protection of technology intensive industries through TRIPs is a clear example of 
such encouragement as mentioned earlier. 
 Before ending this section, note that applying the CGE models in their 
simulations, the neo-liberals conclude that developing countries are the major winner of 
the simulated Doha scenarios (e.g.Kimman and Lodefalk, 2007 and Bouet et.al, 2007). 
These models, however, are based on restrictive and unrealistic assumptions and static 
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comparative advantage theory disregarding the need for supply capacity building in 
accordance with the principle of dynamic comparative advantage. 
 
V. Lessons from History 
The experience of successful industrializers and premature liberalization in 
colonies and in developing countries, in more recent years, provide us with lessons from 
history indicating that across-the-board and premature liberalization will lead to de-
industrialization (Shafaeddin (2005.a and 2006.b). The experience of successful early and 
late industrializers indicates first of all that with the exception of Hong Kong, no country 
has managed to industrialize without going through the infant industry protection phase, 
although across-the-board import substitution and prolonged protection have also led to 
inefficiency and failure24. 
Secondly, government intervention, both functional and selective, in the flow of 
trade and in the economy in general has played a crucial role in the process of 
industrialization. In all cases, including Great Britain, industrialization began on a 
selective basis, although to a different degree, and continued in the same manner until the 
industrial sector was consolidated. 
 Thirdly, when their industries matured, they began to liberalize selectively and 
gradually. Therefore, trade liberalization is beneficial after an industry reaches a certain 
level of maturity provided it is done gradually and selectively. In contrast, premature 
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  The following paragraphs are based on Shafaeddin (2006.b).  
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trade liberalization, whether during the colonial era or in more recent decades, has had 
disappointing results. For example, when the USA tried to liberalize pre-maturely in 
1847-61, the industrial sector suffered and the country had to revert to protectionism 
against imports from Great Britain. 
 Fourthly, government intervention was not confined to trade; the state intervened 
through other means, directly and indirectly, in particular to promote investment and to 
develop the necessary institutions and infrastructure. Industrialization was also supported 
by attention to and growth in agricultural production. Hence, the issue is not the lack of 
intervention, but the nature and the efficiency of intervention. 
 Fifthly, while different countries did not follow exactly the same path, all learned 
from the experience of others; the USA learned from Great Britain, Germany from the 
USA, Japan from Germany and the Republic of Korea from Japan, etc. 
 Sixthly, all main early industrializers tried to open the markets in other countries 
when their industrial sector matured. In the 19th century, free trade policy was forced on 
the colonies and the 5 per cent rule (according to which 5 per cent was the maximum 
tariff rate allowed on any import item) was imposed on semi-colonies and independent 
countries through "unequal" bilateral treaties and/or through force (for example, in China, 
after the opium war of 1839-42). 
 Further, the policy space of the colonies, in the 19th century, was further limited 
by England by outlawing high value-added manufacturing activities in the colonies and 
banning the export of competing items from colonies to England (Chang2005.b). Instead, 
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production of primary products was instituted and promoted. The outcome of the 
imposition of pre-mature trade liberalization on the colonies was devastation and led to 
de-industrialization. For example over 90 per cent of textiles industries of India were 
destroyed as a result of liberalization by the colonial power. 
Recent experience 
 During recent decades, developing countries have been pushed through 
multilateral organizations and bilateral trade agreements to open their markets. In 
addition, tariff peaks and escalation and arbitrary anti-dumping measures have been 
among the means of restricting imports of high-value added products from developing 
countries. The results of a study, by the author, of about 50 developing countries which 
have undertaken trade liberalization during the 1990s indicates that with the exception of 
East Asia, their trade liberalization has had three main features which are common with 
the proposals of developed countries in NAMA negotiations:  
• Uniformity: i.e. a tendency toward uniform tariff rates for various industries in 
each country;  
• Universality, i.e. application of the same recipe to all countries irrespective of 
their level of industrialization and development;  
• Premature and rapid liberalization. 
The results of this kind of liberalization have been disappointing for most of the 
countries other than those in East Asia. Firstly, only 20 countries, or 40% of the sample, 
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have shown high (more than 10% a year) rate of growth of exports of manufactured 
goods. And of these, only in about 10 countries (mostly in East Asia) were high growth 
rates of exports accompanied with increasing or high growth rates of Manufacturing 
Value Added (MVA). MVA is a more important indicator of performance than export, as 
it measures the net output or income accruing to the country, whereas a rise in exports 
could also be accompanied by a corresponding or even higher rise in imports (including 
of inputs that are used in the production of exports).  
Secondly, and more importantly, in fact, in half of the sample countries de-
industrialization took place over 1980-2000. The premature fall in MVA/GDP ratio is 
taken as an indicator of de-industrialization. This ratio declined without recovering to the 
initial level. In many countries industrial employment also suffered severely. 
Thirdly, when exports expanded, this growth was mainly in resource-based industry 
and some assembly operation without much upgrading, except for industries which were 
dynamic during the import-substitution era and were near the stage of maturity, or which 
continued to benefit from some sort of support from the government. The aerospace 
industry of Brazil is a good example of an industry which was near the stage of maturity 
and benefited from liberalization.  
 Fourthly, even though the relative incentives changed in favour of exports, the 
manufacturing industry suffered from low investment despite a significant increase in 
foreign direct investment in some cases (for example, Brazil). Investment in 
manufacturing suffered because the balance of risk and return turned against the 
manufacturing sector (Shafaeddin, 2006.b). 
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 The above survey results add to the conclusion that low and uniform bound tariff 
rates, particularly if it tends to zero in the next round, would imply the end of 
industrialization of many developing countries; and it would prevents the upgrading of 
the industrial structure of others. 
 If so, developing countries have not lost anything by the collapse of the talks. 
Further, they will not lose anything if the resumption of the talks is to lead to the 
acceptance of the proposal made by developed countries on NAMA. These proposals, if 
agreed upon, would lock the structure of production and exports of the majority of 
developing countries into primary commodities, simple resource-based and labour 
intensive products and at most assembly operations. The developed countries proposals 
on services and agriculture are not much different as far as development of developing 
countries is concerned.  
One should not confuse ends with means. An agreement, should serve the 
purpose of development, it should not be concluded simply for the sake of having an 
agreement; development should not be sacrificed for reaching an agreement. The 
failure to reach a bad or damaging agreement will in fact be a success for 
development. However, developing countries should not accept being bullied to 
unequal bi-lateral free trade agreements either. 
 In developing countries, different industries require different rates of protection 
and different lengths of time for their development. This is because there are differences 
in risks and scales of production involved in different industries which also need different 
length of time and experience for their technological upgrading. Another problem is that 
uniform tariff rates provide different effective rates of protection for various industries, 
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depending on their import intensity. For given uniform rates for output and inputs, the 
higher the import intensity, the lower the effective rate of protection. As a result uniform 
rates involve biases against new industries as new industries usually have high import 
intensity. This explains why assembly operations do not easily lead to increases in value 
added. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
The Doha Round was supposed to be a Development Round, but in practice, it was 
turned into “market access” round by developed countries in their own favour.  
Developed countries were pushing developing countries to cut tariffs on their industrial 
and agricultural goods, and services substantially and reduce restrictions on activities of 
multinationals in exchange mainly for a slight cut in their tariffs on industrial goods and 
in their domestic supports for agriculture. Therefore, while developed countries would 
gain significant market access in developing countries particularly for manufactured 
goods, developing countries would lose their policy space to develop their industry in 
accordance with the principal of “dynamic comparative advantage”. Of course, they 
would gain some market access for products for which they have static comparative 
advantage. But it would be at the cost of their diversification and development in the 
long-run. This is the gist of the problem which is also related to the philosophy behind 
GATT/WTO rules based on the Neo-classical static comparative cost advantage theory.  
 As long as the philosophy behind GATT/WTO is not changed and the related 
contradiction are not dealt with “do not hold out hopes for the Doha Round” or fair 
treatment of developing countries in the future. What is needed first of all is that before 
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conducting trade negotiation, developing countries should have a clear concept of their 
industrial development strategy and trade policy. This is a necessary condition. However, 
it should be emphasized that any intervention might not serve the purpose of 
diversification and upgrading. For this purpose the decision making capacity of the 
government should improve to enhance the efficiency of its policy making mechanism. 
While a country may learn from the experience of others, it can not copy them; each 
country has its own characteristics which may be different from others to some extent.  
 The sufficient condition is that the rules of the World Trading System should be 
changed in a way that would allow a dynamic and flexible trade policy with dimensions 
of space and time according to which the trade rules would25: 
 Accommodate countries with different levels of industrialization and 
development at each point in time, therefore allowing “Special and Differential 
Treatment” as a rule not as an exception; 
 Therefore, the concept of “less than full reciprocity” should be taken more 
seriously as countries are at different levels of development and have different 
needs; 
  Allow change of trade policy in each country as the country develops; hence a 
country should be allowed the necessary policy space for both selective infant 
industry protection and gradual and selective liberalization, when an industry 
reaches near maturity;  
                                                 
25
 For details see Shafaeddin (2005.b), and Wade (2006)10-13. 
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 For liberalization of the tariff structure, flexibility would dictate that only average 
tariffs (which may be even higher than the current average rate) are bound with 
significant dispersion (Akuz 2005); 
 Permit the use of export performance requirements by developing countries in 
TRIMS; 
 Let easier transfer of technology to developing countries by changing TRIPS 
Agreement and revising Subsidy and Countervailing Measures Agreement and 
GATS to provide more policy space for developing countries. 
 Of course, such a re-conceptualization of the trading system will not take place 
over night, but it eventually need to happen (Helleiner, 2005). The problem, according to 
C. Barshefsky, the former US trade representative, at the moment is that "the developing 
world is not hearing what we are saying and we’re not hearing what developing world is 
saying. We are passing [each other] like ships in the night". Yet developing countries are 
often blamed for the lack of progress in the trade talks.  There is no need to put first 
priority on concluding the negotiations simply to avoid blame for the "failure", if the 
results of the negotiations are a recipe for their countries' de-industrialization. But the 
failure of talks should not lead to the acceptance of unfavourable bilateral agreements, 
which are often more stringent than multilateral agreements. 
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Appendix A: 
The Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More  
Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of developing Countries. 
The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them 
in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to trade of 
developing countries, i.e. the developed countries do not expect the developing 
countries, in the course of negotiations to make contributions which are inconsistent 
with their individual development, financial and trade needs. Developed contracting 
parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall less-developed contracting parties be 
required to make, concessions that are inconsistent with the latter’s development, 
financial and trade needs” 
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